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By making use of the Duncan&Hoffman model, the paper estimates returns to educational 
mismatch using comparable microdata for 25 European countries. Our aim is to investigate 
the extent to which the main empirical regularities produced by other papers on the subject 
are confirmed by our data base. On the basis of tests proposed by Hartog&Oosterbeek, we 
also consider whether the observed empirical patterns are in line with the Mincerian basic 
human  capital  model  and  Thurow’s  job  competition  model.  Using  Heckman’s  sample 
selection  estimator,  we  find  that  results  are  rather  consistent  with  those  found  in  the 
literature, and that both the job competition model, and the Mincerian human capital model 
could be rejected for most of the countries. 
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A  tanulmányban  25  európai  ország,  kétezres  évek  közepi  állapotot  tükröző,  reprezentatív 
keresztmetszeti mintáin egyrészt a Duncan – Hoffman modellre támaszkodva megvizsgáljuk, 
hogy  adatbázisunk  milyen  mértékben  tükrözi  az  illeszkedés  bérhozamával  foglalkozó 
irodalom  legfontosabb  empirikus  következtetéseit,  másrészt     a  Hartog    Oosterbeek  által 
javasolt  statisztikai  próbák  segítségével  –  azt  elemezzük,  hogy  empirikus  modellünk 
eredményei alapján mit mondhatunk az emberi tőke minceri alapmodelljének és a thurowi 
állásverseny  modelljének  érvényességéről.  A  becsléseket  Heckman  szelekciós  torzítást 
kiküszöbölő  becslőfüggvényével  végeztük,  s  azt  találtuk,  hogy  eredményeink  többnyire 
egybecsengenek az irodalomban található empirikus szabályosságokkal. A statisztikai próbák 
az  országok  többségében  cáfolják  mind  a  minceri,  mind  a  thurowi  modell  empirikus 
érvényességét. 
 
Tárgyszavak: a munka és az iskolai végzettség illeszkedése, túlképzés, alulképzés,  




Recently,  a  growing  number  of  studies2  have  been  concerned  with  the  labour  market 
consequences of inadequate education. The paper estimates returns to educational mismatch 
using comparable microdata for 25 European countries. It complements the literature3 on the 
effect of underschooling and overschooling on wages. First, using Duncan&Hoffman (1981) 
model we try to investigate to what extent the main empirical findings of the literature are 
valid  for  our  samples.  Bauer  (2002),  drawing  on  Hartog  (2000),  summarises  the  main 
empirical results as follows: the returns to attained years of schooling are lower than the 
returns  to  required  years  of  schooling  (Result  1  –  R1);  the  returns  to  overeducation  are 
positive but smaller than the wage premium associated with a year of required education 
(R2); the returns to years of undereducation are negative (R3), but their absolute value is 
smaller  than  the  returns  to  required  education  (R4),  and  smaller  than  the  returns  to 
overeducation  (R5);  the  estimated  returns  to  overeducation  are  always  significant  (R6), 
whereas  those  to  undereducation  are  not  so  (R7).  Second,  applying  the  statistical  tests 
proposed by Hartog&Oosterbeek (1988), we also consider whether the observed empirical 
patterns are consistent with the standard Mincerian human capital model (Mincer 1974) or 
Thurow’s job competition model (Thurow 1975).    
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the Duncan&Hoffman model 
and  the  Hartog&Oosterbeek  tests,  Section  3  provides  information  on  data,  definitions, 
variables, and estimation techniques, Section 4 reports the main empirical findings, Section 5 
concludes. 
2. THE MODEL 
 
The  Duncan&Hoffman  model  decomposes  attained  years  of  education  (S)  into  years  of 
education required on a job (R), years of over  (O) and underschooling (U): S = R + O – U. 
This implies S = R for an adequately educated individual, S = R + O (O > 0) if the worker is 
overeducated,  and  S  =  R  –  U  (U  >  0)  in  the  case  of  undereducation.  For  a  sample  of 
individuals  and  using  linearised  specification,  the  earnings  equation  estimating  the 
(constant) average returns to a year of required, over  and undereducation can be written as       
 
                                                 
2 Theoretical and measurement problems are summarised in Hartog (2000), Green&McIntosh&Vignoles (1999), 
van der Velden&van Smoorenburg (1997), Borghans&de Grip (1999). Groot&Maassen van den Brink (2000). 
Hartog (2000) and Rubb (2003b) report many empirical results. 
3  For  example  Chevalier  (2003),  Cohn&Khan  (1995),  Cohn&Ng  (2000),  Daly&Büchel&Duncan  (2000), 
Dolton&Vignoles  (2000),  Groot  (1996),  Mendes  de  Oliveira&Santos&Kiker  (2000),  Rubb  (2003a),  Vahey 
(2000)).   
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U O R w U O R α α α α + + + = 0 , 
 
where w denotes log earnings,  R w R ∂ ∂ = α ,  O w o ∂ ∂ = α , and  U w U ∂ ∂ = α  stand for the 
returns to educational (mis)match to be estimated. If the expected estimation results hold 
then  O α  > 0 and  R α  >  O α  (R2);  U α  < 0 (R3);   R α  >  U α (R4);  O α  >  U α (R5); and  R α  > 
O α >  U α  (R2, R4, R5). 
According  to  Hartog&Oosterbeek,  since  in  a  Mincerian  setting  the  educational 
requirements of the job do not affect wages, then the equality of the following parameters 
should hold:  | | U O R α α α = = ; as for Thurow’s model, wages are determined by the marginal 
productivity requirements of the job, individuals’ assets are irrelevant, thus the estimation 
should  produce  | | U O α α = .  Note  that  if  the  Mincerian  model  is  accepted,  R2  and/or  R4 
and/or R5 have to be rejected, if Thurow’s model seems to be valid, then R5 cannot hold. 
3. DATA, VARIABLES, ESTIMATORS 
 
We use European Social Survey data4 (Jowel et al. 2005).5 The data were collected in 2004 to 
20066 for a large number of countries using a common questionnaire. The overall sample 
used in the paper consists of 25 European countries out of which 20 and 2 are members of 
the  EU,7  and  the  European  Economic  Area,8  respectively.  The  remaining  countries  are 
Switzerland,  Turkey,  and  Ukraine.  The  size  of  the  pooled  sample,  for  which  earnings 
equations can be estimated   that is, that the number of persons with non zero earnings – is 
about  13500.  Individual  countries’  sample  size  varies  between  200  and  900  that  might 
adversely affect the precision of estimations, especially in the case of smaller samples.9 
The first key variable we use here is the usual before tax monthly wage (in Euro). The 
original  variable  refers  to  different  time  periods  for  different  countries.  As  regards  the 
number of persons with non zero wage in the pooled sample, about 74 per cent have monthly 
earnings data. For 13, 8, and 5 per cent of the respondents the periods are a year, four weeks, 
and one or two weeks, respectively. Thus in the case of 26 per cent of the observations the 
                                                 
4 ESS round 2; the data file used in the paper was released on 12-12-2006.  
5 The data archive and distributor of ESS data is the Norwegian Social Science Data Services; for information 
see http://ess.nsd.uib.no.  
6 62 per cent of interviews were done in 2004, 34 per cent in 2005, four per cent in 2006. 
7 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 
8 Iceland and Norway. 
9 For sample sizes see Table A1.  
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original variable was recoded.10 The average worker of the pooled sample earns 1218 euros 
(standard deviation: 3.53) and the country averages range from 47 (Ukraine) to 3300 euros 
(Denmark).11        
Schooling is measured as years of full time education completed (highest level).12 Since 
the  survey  provides  no  information  about  part time  education,  it  is  likely  that  education 
attainment  is  underestimated  and  as  a  consequence  returns  to  education  will  be 
overestimated.    
Educational mismatch depends on how education required on a job is measured. Out of 
the three standard methods (job analyst method, subjective method, and the method based 
on realised matches),13 here we can use the second one that relies on self reporting. Two 
variables are available to produce the required education variable. The exact wording of these 
questions is as follows: 1. if someone was applying nowadays for the job you do now, would 
they need any education or vocational schooling beyond compulsory education?, and 2. about 
how many years of education or vocational schooling beyond compulsory education  would 
they need? The second variable is not fully continuous and it is truncated from above. The 
truncation  does  not  seem  serious  since  only  four  per  cent  of  workers  report  the  highest 
number of years (at least 10 years of required education beyond compulsory school).  In case 
of interval coding we use interval midpoints.14 Required years of education are reported in 
relation to compulsory education, so we need to know the years of compulsory education. 
They  are  available  from  the  UNESCO  statistical  data  base  and  the  information  refers  to 
2004.15 The years of required education variable is produced with the help of the two original 
required education variables and the UNESCO data. Then, years of under and overeduation 
are computed using the required and attained education variables. 
Table  1  presents  the  incidence  of  educational  mismatch.  The  proportion  of  properly 
educated workers amounts to 8 per cent for the pooled sample varying between one (Turkey) 
and  19  per  cent  (Austria);  when  the  samples  are  pooled  33  per  cent  of  workers  are 
overeducated, and this ranges from 15 (Netherlands) to 79 per cent (Estonia). On average, the 
number  of  the  undereducated  is  59  per  cent  with  important  cross country  differences; 
Estonia represents the lowest value (13 per cent), and Netherlands do the highest one (82 per 
cent).      
 
                                                 
10 Weekly and bi-weekly earnings were multiplied by 4.4, and 2.2, respectively. Wages referring to four weeks 
were multiplied by 1.075, annual earnings were divided by 12.  
11 For means and standard deviations see Table A1. 
12 Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 2.  
13 see Hartog (2000), Green&McIntosh&Vignoles (1999), van der Velden&van Smoorenburg (1997), 
Borghans&de Grip (1999).  
14 The variable is coded as: less than 1 year (beyond compulsory school); about 1 year; about 2 years; about 3 
years; about 4-5 years; about 6-7 years; about 8-9 years; 10 years or more (beyond compulsory school).  
15 See Table A1 in the Appendix             
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Table 1 
The number of properly, over- and undereducated workers (per cent) 
 
  Properly  Over-  Under-  Together 
Country  educated   
Austria  18.8  46.7  34.5  100 
Belgium  12.6  25.1  62.3  100 
Czech 
Republic  6.2  49.5  44.3  100 
Denmark  8.4  52.6  39.1  100 
Estonia  8.2  78.9  12.9  100 
Finland  8.4  52.6  39.0  100 
France  8.0  26.6  65.3  100 
Germany  9.1  19.5  71.3  100 
Great Britain  9.2  28.2  62.6  100 
Greece  4.8  77.1  18.2  100 
Hungary  5.2  31.1  63.7  100 
Iceland  4.7  47.7  47.7  100 
Ireland  10.7  67.4  21.9  100 
Luxembourg  5.6  45.1  49.3  100 
Netherlands  3.3  14.7  82.0  100 
Norway  7.6  41.3  51.2  100 
Poland  4.1  59.1  36.8  100 
Portugal  17.5  33.3  49.2  100 
Slovakia  15.1  46.7  38.2  100 
Slovenia  4.8  17.5  77.7  100 
Spain  5.6  50.2  44.3  100 
Sweden  8.9  40.1  51.0  100 
Switzerland  10.0  22.4  67.6  100 
Turkey  1.4  27.9  70.8  100 
Ukraine  11.5  24.1  64.4  100 
Pooled sample  8.0  32.9  59.1  100 
N  13488       
 
The  number  of  properly  educated  is  low,  and  that  of  undereducated  is  high  when 
compared  to  the  results  of  other  surveys.  As  regards  studies  based  on  the  self reporting 
method, Hartog (2000), reviewing the empirical results of the literature, finds that the lowest 
value  for  the  properly  educated  is  47  per  cent,  and  the  highest  one  for  the  over   and 
undereducated  are  33  and  32  per  cent,  respectively.  In  Groot&Maassen  van  den  Brink 
(2000)’s paper focussing on meta analysis the upper limit for overeducation incidence is 42 
and  that  for  undereducation  amounts  to  20  per  cent  in  the  case  of  studies  applying  the 
subjective method.      
Years of attained, required, over , and undereducation, and their standard deviations are 
shown in Table 2.   
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Table 2  
Years of attained, required, over-, and undereducation          
 
  Attained  Required  Over-  Under- 
  education 
Country  mean  s.d.  mean  s.d.  mean  s.d.  mean  s.d. 
Austria  12.6  2.9  12.2  2.8  2.4  2.0  1.5  1.2 
Belgium  13.5  3.5  14.9  2.0  2.2  1.7  3.1  2.7 
Czech Republic  12.8  2.3  12.6  2.5  2.1  1.2  1.6  0.9 
Denmark  14.5  3.2  13.9  3.1  2.7  2.1  2.0  1.9 
Estonia  13.1  2.9  10.9  2.2  3.1  2.1  1.6  1.0 
Finland  14.1  3.6  13.6  2.7  2.7  1.9  2.2  1.5 
France  12.9  3.8  14.5  2.8  2.1  1.7  3.3  2.4 
Germany  13.7  3.1  15.7  2.5  2.3  1.7  3.1  1.7 
Great Britain  12.9  3.0  13.7  2.4  2.6  1.7  2.4  1.8 
Greece  12.8  3.7  10.5  2.1  3.7  2.1  2.9  1.4 
Hungary  12.8  2.6  14.2  3.1  1.6  1.0  2.7  1.6 
Iceland  14.3  4.0  14.9  3.6  2.8  1.9  3.5  3.3 
Ireland  13.4  3.2  12.3  2.5  3.0  1.8  2.4  2.1 
Luxembourg  12.2  4.5  12.7  3.2  2.9  2.1  3.4  2.7 
Netherlands  13.6  3.4  16.6  2.5  1.9  1.7  3.9  2.4 
Norway  14.1  3.4  14.4  2.7  2.4  1.8  2.5  1.8 
Poland  12.9  2.9  12.0  2.9  2.8  1.9  1.7  1.3 
Portugal  9.2  4.4  10.5  2.7  3.0  1.7  3.6  1.7 
Slovakia  12.9  2.7  12.4  2.9  2.9  2.0  1.9  2.0 
Slovenia  12.5  3.3  14.3  2.7  1.8  1.4  2.7  1.9 
Spain  13.3  5.1  12.9  2.8  4.3  3.4  3.4  2.6 
Sweden  13.2  3.1  13.5  2.7  2.3  1.5  2.2  1.6 
Switzerland  10.9  3.3  12.9  2.8  2.0  1.6  3.6  2.1 
Turkey  9.6  3.9  11.5  3.4  2.5  1.4  3.7  2.5 
Ukraine  12.4  2.4  13.5  2.0  2.1  1.3  2.2  1.4 
Pooled sample  13.0  3.5  13.8  3.0  2.7  2.1  2.9  2.1 
N  13488    13488    4443    7971   
Years of over- and undereducation were computed for the over- and undereducated 
 
The average worker in the pooled sample has completed 13 years of schooling. The data 
exhibit a great deal of cross country heterogeneity, however. Education attained is less than 
10 years in Portugal and Turkey, and it is higher than 14 years in four Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway). On average, required education exceeds attained 
education by 0,8 years; for ten countries, however, the opposite holds, the former is lower 
than the latter.16 For the typical Dutch worker required education amounts to 16.6 years, 
whereas the value of the same indicator seems much lower for the Greek worker (10.5 years). 
The average overeducated worker of the pooled sample has 2.7 years of surplus schooling. 
The values range from 1.6 (Hungary) to 4.9 (Spain) years for individual countries. As regards 
years of underschooling, the data exhibit 2.9 years of undereducation and country means fall 
within the interval of 1.5 (Austria) to 3.9 (Netherlands) years. 
                                                 
16 Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Spain, Slovakia  
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Testing R1 requires estimating earnings functions so as to obtain parameter estimates for 
the attained education variable. In addition, we need earnings equations to be estimated with 
educational  mismatch  variables  formulated  according  the  Duncan&Hofmann  model.  The 
equations are of the standard Mincerian type. The dependent variable is the log monthly 
wage,  the  key  explanatory  variables  are  years  of  education  attained     for  the  earnings 
functions, and the three matching variables (years of required, over  and undereducation) as 
regards the earnings equations with the educational mismatch variables. Sex (female =1), and 
potential labour market experience and its square are also inserted in all the equations. When 
the samples are pooled a series of country dummies are present in the equations in order to 
control  for  cross country  differences  (reference  category:  Austria).  The  equations  are 
estimated by ols17 and Heckman’s (1979) selectivity bias corrected estimator.18 As regards 
participation equations, estimated by probit, and needed for the Heckman model, control 
variables include a female dummy, age, age squared, the number and the sex of dependent 
children in the family. Participation equations are estimated for ILO’s able bodied persons 
(aged 15 74).                      
4. RESULTS   
 
As  for  the  earnings  equations  with  the  educational mismatch  variables,  the  sign  of  the 
estimated  coefficients  for  the  selection  variable  is  negative  (except  for  one  equation), 
implying that wages would be overestimated by ols. In addition, for 17 countries and the 
pooled sample the estimation yields parameter estimates for the selection variable that are 
significant (at the p = 0.05 level). Thus, the selectivity bias assumption can be accepted.19 Out 
of 78 estimated coefficients, the selectivity bias corrected estimates of the three educational 
mismatch variables20 produce 51 parameters that are significantly different from zero (at the 
p = 0.05 level), and for 28 coefficient estimates, Heckman’s estimator yields at least a 0.5 
percentage point  high  difference  in  returns  to  educational  mismatch  compared  to  ols 
estimates.21 Therefore, selectivity bias is detected for 68 per cent of the countries, and using 
                                                 
17 Although the main empirical tool relating to the effect of educational mismatch on wages is still ols, some 
authors choose other estimators even for cross-sectional data. For example, Budría&Moro-Egido (2008), and 
McGuinness&Bennett (2007) use quantile regression; Guironnet&Peypoch (2007) and Jensen&Gartner&Rässler 
(2006) apply stochastic production frontier models. Note that a growing number of estimates are based on panel 
data  (see  Battu&Belfield&Sloane  1999,  Bauer  2002,  Daly&Büchel&Duncan  2000,  Dolton&Silles  2008, 
Dolton&Vignoles 2000, Rubb 2006).    
18 The estimator has rarely been used in this literature. Exceptions are Sloane&Battu&Seaman (1999), Dolton& 
Vignoles (2000), and di Pietro&Urwin (2006). 
19 For parameter estimates of the selection correction variable and the independence of earnings and participation 
equations see Table A2.  
20 Estimation results are presented in Table 4. 
21 Ols estimates for the educational mismatch variables are reported in Table A3.  
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Heckman’s estimator, as opposed to ols estimates, results in sensible differences in returns to 
educational mismatch for about one third of the estimated parameters.      
The results of selectivity bias corrected estimations are mixed, and reporting practice is 
not  unanimous  in  the  literature.  Sloane&Battu&Seaman  (1999)  arrive  at  non significant 
parameter  estimates  for  the  selection correction  variable,  but  the  authors  report  only 
estimates produced by the Heckman’s estimator. Dolton&Vignoles (2000), in their study on 
higher education graduates, estimate selectivity bias corrected regression for women only, 
and they conclude that while there is some sign of the presence of sample selection, the effect 
of self selection on returns to educational mismatch is negligible; therefore they do not report 
results  from  selectivity bias corrected  estimations.  Di  Pietro&Urwin  (2006)  find  that  the 
parameter estimates for the selection variable is significantly different from zero, but the 
coefficients estimated by ols and Heckman’s estimator are not significantly different; thus 
parameters estimated by ols are not reported.        
As  regards  our  standard  earnings  equations,  estimates  for  the  selection  variable  are 
significant for the pooled sample and 15 countries, and they are mostly negative.22 Using 
Heckman’s23 or ols24 estimator result in only slight differences in returns to education for the 
majority  of  the  countries;  only  one  fifth  of  the  estimated  coefficients  show  at  least  0.05 
percentage point differences. Note that as for the returns to education variable, all parameter 
estimates produced by both estimators are significant (at the p = 0.05 level).   
Our ols estimates for returns to education are in general higher than those estimated by 
ols and reported in Trostel&Walker&Woolley (2002), and in Flabbi&Paternostro&Tiongson 
(2007). Putting aside difference in time periods for which the data are collected, this may be 
due partly to the specification of the independent variable. Both papers work with after tax 
wage rates, whereas our measure of remuneration is before taxes and monthly. Using before 
tax earnings yields higher returns when there is a progressive income tax system (as might be 
the case for most of the countries in our database). Making use of monthly earnings would 
produce higher wage premium for the better educated than wage rates do, if higher levels of 
education are associated with longer working hours. 
Most of the empirical regularities found in the literature seem to hold for our samples. As 
regards R1,25 the expected results are observed for 22 countries; the exceptions are the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. Estimates for the pooled sample also show higher returns to 
required than to attained education; an extra year of required schooling yields 2.5 percentage 
point higher wages than an additional year of observed schooling  (see Table 3).   
 
                                                 
22 For details, see Table A4.  
23 See Table A4. 
24 See Table A5. 
25 returns to attained education are lower than returns to required education  
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A brief inspection of coefficients in Table 4 also provides some support for the empirical 
results found elsewhere. As for R2,26 returns to overeducation are positive but smaller than 
the  wage  premium  associated  with  a  year  of  required  education  for  each  country.  Our 
estimations based on ESS data also confirm R327 in the case of 23 countries – only the Irish 
and  Slovene  samples  fail  to  exhibit  the  general  empirical  pattern,  since  the  sign  of  their 
estimated  parameters  are  positive.  R428  holds  for  all  countries,  meaning  that  returns  to 
required education are always higher than the absolute value of those to undereducation.  
Table 3 
Returns to required and attained education, per cent 
  Required  Attained 
Country  education 
Austria  7.5  6.2 
Belgium  9.4  3.5 
Czech Republic  7.1  7.1 
Denmark  6.7  4.6 
Estonia  13.8  8.8 
Finland  8.7  5.4 
France  15.0  7.6 
Germany  11.2  7.6 
Great Britain  14.3  9.7 
Greece  9.3  3.4 
Hungary  13.5  12.5 
Iceland  7.6  4.0 
Ireland  8.7  6.7 
Luxembourg  10.0  5.7 
Netherlands  12.9  7.3 
Norway  6.9  5.3 
Poland  9.7  8.2 
Portugal  16.4  8.0 
Slovakia  9.1  6.4 
Slovenia  8.5  8.7 
Spain  8.6  5.1 
Sweden  7.4  5.8 
Switzerland  8.5  5.5 
Turkey  10.9  8.6 
Ukraine  6.2  8.6 
Pooled sample  9.7  7.2 
Parameters estimated by Heckman's selection-correction estimator 
All estimates are significant at least at the p=0.05 level 
For returns to observed education see Table A4 
For returns to required education see Table 4 
 
                                                 
26 returns to overeducation are positive but smaller than returns to required education,  R α  >  O α  
27  returns to undereducation are negative, U α  < 0 
28  the absolute value of the returns to undereducation is smaller than returns to required education,  R α  >  U α   
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As  regards  R5,29  it  holds  for  16  countries.  In  order  to  obtain  R630  we  would  need 
significant parameter estimates for the overeducation variable in each of the countries, but 
only more than a half of them exhibit this pattern. The estimated coefficient for the years of 
undereducation variable is not significant for 14 countries, thus R731 is also supported by the 
data. By taking a look at the parameters for the pooled sample we can conclude that R2 to R6 
hold  true,  and  that  the  parameter  estimated  for  returns  to  undereducation  significantly 
differs from zero (see Table 4).     
We also have run Wald tests in order to check whether the expected results involving two 
coefficients hold or not; this concerns R2, R4, and R5. The null hypothesis is that the two 
coefficients are equal (see Table 5). 
As regards R2, the equality of the coefficients could not be rejected for four countries, but 
we can accept observed differences in the parameter estimates in the case of 16 countries and 
the pooled sample at the p = 0.05 level, and five countries at the p =0.1 level.  
                                                 
29 the absolute value of the returns to undereducation is smaller than returns to overeducation,   O α  >  U α  
30 returns to overeducation are always significant 
31 returns to undereducation are not always significant  
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Table 4  
Returns to educational mismatch, per cent 
 
  Required education  Overeducation  Undereducation 
Country  Coefficient  %  z  Coefficient  %  z  Coefficient  %  z 
Austria  0.072  7.5  6.60  0.030  3.1  1.79  -0.025  -2.5  -0.97 
Belgium  0.089  9.4  6.29  0.027  2.8  1.58  -0.028  -2.8  -1.67 
Czech Republic  0.069  7.1  5.78  0.065  6.7  3.38  -0.002  -0.2  -0.07 
Denmark  0.065  6.7  6.41  0.015  1.5  1.17  -0.034  -3.4  -1.96 
Estonia  0.129  13.8  13.25  0.044  4.5  3.72  -0.022  -2.2  -0.74 
Finland  0.083  8.7  14.40  0.008  0.8  0.80  -0.025  -2.5  -2.23 
France  0.139  15.0  12.77  0.035  3.5  1.41  -0.078  -7.5  -6.93 
Germany  0.106  11.2  9.78  0.049  5.1  2.31  -0.033  -3.2  -2.75 
Great Britain  0.134  14.3  5.20  0.013  1.3  0.54  -0.025  -2.4  -1.16 
Greece  0.088  9.3  5.03  0.072  7.4  4.67  -0.046  -4.5  -1.72 
Hungary  0.127  13.5  7.50  0.051  5.2  1.71  -0.069  -6.7  -3.25 
Iceland  0.074  7.6  7.41  0.027  2.8  1.54  -0.001  -0.1  -0.11 
Ireland  0.083  8.7  3.66  0.035  3.6  1.52  0.015  1.5  0.49 
Luxembourg  0.096  10.0  11.92  0.081  8.5  6.74  -0.005  -0.5  -0.67 
Netherlands  0.121  12.9  11.58  0.008  0.8  0.34  -0.034  -3.3  -3.36 
Norway  0.067  6.9  9.58  0.030  3.1  2.67  -0.014  -1.4  -1.11 
Poland  0.092  9.7  8.91  0.061  6.3  4.75  -0.006  -0.6  -0.28 
Portugal  0.152  16.4  15.72  0.066  6.8  4.43  -0.028  -2.8  -2.00 
Slovakia  0.087  9.1  10.18  0.050  5.2  2.21  -0.010  -1.0  -0.64 
Slovenia  0.082  8.5  4.24  0.014  1.4  0.32  0.002  0.2  0.06 
Spain  0.083  8.6  7.85  0.039  4.0  3.77  -0.035  -3.5  -2.72 
Sweden  0.071  7.4  16.14  0.020  2.0  2.03  -0.023  -2.3  -2.71 
Switzerland  0.081  8.5  8.95  0.030  3.1  1.70  -0.026  -2.5  -2.32 
Turkey  0.103  10.9  4.15  0.042  4.3  1.23  -0.058  -5.6  -2.26 
Ukraine  0.060  6.2  2.32  0.002  0.2  0.05  -0.051  -5.0  -1.26 
Pooled sample  0.093  9.7  12.93  0.028  2.8  4.12  -0.021  -2.1  -3.06 
Parameters estimated by Heckman's selection-correction estimator. 
The equations estimated 
earnings equation 
dependent variable: log usual monthly before-tax earnings 
control variables: sex, potential labour market experience and its square; country dummies in the case of pooled 
sample (reference: Austria) 
participation equation 
dependent variable: worker 
control variables: sex, age, age squared, number of choldren in the family, sex of children; country dummies in 
the case of pooled sample (reference: Austria) 
 
 
We arrive at R4 for 21 countries and the pooled sample at the p=0.05 level, and two 
countries at the p=0.1 level. However, in the case of the remaining two countries, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the two estimated parameters are equal.  
An important finding from the present estimations is that R5 does not seem to hold as a 
general rule. As we can see from Table 4, the absolute value of returns to underschooling is 
not smaller than returns to overschooling for 9 countries. In addition, the statistical tests 
displayed in Table 5 show that the equality of the two coefficients cannot be rejected for 21  
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countries and the pooled sample, implying that for an overwhelming majority of the cases R5 
does not hold. That is, the wage penalty associated with a year of undereducation is not lower 
than the wage premium due to a year of overeducation.  
Let us turn to the Hartog&Oosterbeek (1988) tests elaborated for the Duncan&Hoffman 
(1981) model. The job competition model can be rejected, since the hypothesis that both 
coefficients are zero does not seem to hold for 17 countries and the pooled sample, although 
for the remaining 8 countries it can be accepted. Similar results are arrived at with regard to 
the  standard  Mincerian  model.  The  equality  of  the  three  coefficients  is  rejected  for  23 
countries and the pooled sample, thus the Mincerian model can be rejected. 
Table 5 
Wald tests for coefficients’ equality 
  R2  R4  R5   Mincer   Thurow 
Country  chi2  p  chi2  p  chi2  p  chi2  p  ch2  p 
Austria  5.38  0.020  3.68  0.055  0.02  0.882  11.41  0.003  5.04  0.081 
Belgium  7.20  0.073  16.35  0.000  0.00  0.985  22.10  0.000  6.88  0.032 
Czech 
Republic  0.05  0.826  8.58  0.003  2.73  0.098  14.65  0.001  13.63  0.001 
Denmark  11.82  0.001  3.26  0.071  0.72  0.396  15.53  0.000  5.66  0.059 
Estonia  45.78  0.000  12.58  0.000  0.37  0.542  73.15  0.000  35.33  0.000 
Finland  54.00  0.000  28.70  0.000  1.21  0.271  102.49  0.000  6.69  0.035 
France  18.89  0.000  31.86  0.000  2.26  0.133  65.68  0.000  53.69  0.000 
Germany  6.20  0.013  38.95  0.000  0.39  0.530  47.55  0.000  15.63  0.000 
Great Britain  13.23  0.000  20.59  0.000  0.11  0.745  26.55  0.000  1.95  0.377 
Greece  0.68  0.411  2.45  0.118  0.56  0.454  3.19  0.203  32.94  0.000 
Hungary  6.23  0.013  12.26  0.001  0.22  0.637  26.99  0.000  15.25  0.001 
Iceland  6.56  0.010  27.20  0.000  1.18  0.278  37.05  0.000  2.57  0.276 
Ireland  3.31  0.069  24.51  0.000  1.96  0.161  32.82  0.000  2.82  0.244 
Luxembourg  1.97  0.160  80.01  0.000  25.84  0.000  84.32  0.000  47.69  0.000 
Netherlands  19.87  0.000  47.57  0.000  0.88  0.347  61.96  0.000  12.66  0.002 
Norway  8.15  0.004  22.65  0.000  0.77  0.381  40.43  0.000  10.66  0.005 
Poland  4.65  0.031  19.41  0.000  3.94  0.047  32.91  0.000  24.63  0.000 
Portugal  38.87  0.000  63.29  0.000  3.56  0.059  94.40  0.000  22.72  0.000 
Slovakia  3.68  0.055  23.82  0.000  1.91  0.167  42.02  0.000  6.06  0.048 
Slovenia  2.74  0.098  14.60  0.000  0.09  0.765  22.53  0.000  0.10  0.949 
Spain  11.36  0.001  6.25  0.012  0.04  0.846  13.92  0.001  0.37  0.542 
Sweden  24.94  0.000  30.48  0.000  0.05  0.824  72.95  0.000  17.22  0.000 
Switzerland  7.01  0.008  20.49  0.000  0.03  0.858  30.09  0.000  12.27  0.002 
Turkey  3.51  0.061  4.15  0.042  0.13  0.714  9.53  0.009  6.94  0.031 
Ukraine  1.90  0.169  0.06  0.799  0.67  0.413  2.27  0.322  1.64  0.441 
Pooled  81.34  0.000  106.00  0.000  0.43  0.514  178.63  0.000  26.14  0.000 
 
R2 null:  O R α α = , 
R4 null:  | | U R α α = , 
R5 null:  | | U O α α =  
Thurow null:  | | U O α α = =0 
Mincer null:  | | U O R α α α = =   
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Other studies draw mixed conclusions. Groot (1996), using ols estimates, rejects both 
models, and this is consistent with the findings of this paper. Bauer (2002), using panel 
models, examines the parameter estimates for men and women separately. He concludes that 
the Mincerian model can be accepted for females only, and the job competition model can be 
rejected for both sexes.   
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The  paper  investigates  the  wage  effect  of  over   and  undereducation  using  comparable 
microdata for 25 European countries. The results confirm most of the conclusions of the 
existing empirical literature. However, some earlier findings seem not to hold as a general 
empirical rule. Namely, the present estimations produce R1, R2, R3, R4, and R7, whereas R5 
and R6 are not confirmed in our database. We have also found that both the job competition 
model, and the Mincerian human capital model can be rejected for most of the countries.   





Table A1  
Sample characteristics 
  No of workers  Monthly earnings  YCE 
Country    log mean  sd  mean  sd   
Austria  415  7.5  0.51  1781  1.67  9 
Belgium  519  7.7  0.69  2208  1.99  13 
Czech 
Republic  544  6.1  0.42  429  1.52  10 
Denmark  672  8.1  0.82  3316  2.26  10 
Estonia  722  5.8  0.64  322  1.90  9 
Finland  787  7.7  0.46  2148  1.59  10 
France  641  7.5  0.79  1834  2.20  11 
Germany  688  7.6  0.68  1962  1.98  13 
Great Britain  601  7.4  1.05  1683  2.85  12 
Greece  355  7.1  0.56  1252  1.75  9 
Hungary  440  6.1  0.55  447  1.73  10 
Iceland  239  8.1  0.58  3160  1.79  11 
Ireland  609  7.5  1.01  1773  2.75  10 
Luxembourg  438  7.8  0.67  2423  1.96  10 
Netherlands  607  7.7  0.68  2175  1.96  13 
Norway  910  8.0  0.58  3084  1.79  11 
Poland  481  5.9  0.58  359  1.78  9 
Portugal  265  6.5  0.55  685  1.74  9 
Slovakia  332  5.8  0.46  327  1.59  9 
Slovenia  433  5.3  0.51  202  1.66  10 
Spain  418  7.1  0.70  1229  2.02  11 
Sweden  923  7.8  0.39  2348  1.48  10 
Switzerland  689  8.0  0.67  3049  1.96  9 
Turkey  252  6.6  0.69  738  2.00  9 
Ukraine  508  3.9  0.85  47  2.34  12 
Pooled sample  13488  7.1  1.26  1218  3.53   
YCE: Years of compulsory education 




Table A2  
Parameter estimates for the selection-correction variable (lambda) and tests for 
independence of equations 
    Wald test 
Country  Lambda  chi2  p 
Austria  -0.428  16.98  0.0000 
Belgium  0.839  114.58  0.0000 
Czech 
Republic  -0.342  17.20  0.0000 
Denmark  0.046  0.80  0.3717 
Estonia  -0.284  8.30  0.0040 
Finland  -0.153  2.35  0.1249 
France  0.721  165.27  0.0000 
Germany  -0.685  72.20  0.0000 
Great Britain  -1.173  66.78  0.0000 
Greece  0.711  27.15  0.0000 
Hungary  -0.073  0.15  0.6991 
Iceland  -0.071  0.39  0.5348 
Ireland  -1.275  54.82  0.0000 
Luxembourg  -0.623  38.88  0.0000 
Netherlands  -0.103  1.23  0.2668 
Norway  -0.370  7.15  0.0075 
Poland  -0.157  4.25  0.0393 
Portugal  0.659  138.73  0.0000 
Slovakia  -0.015  0.02  0.8897 
Slovenia  -1.260  370.83  0.0000 
Spain  -0.064  1.47  0.2249 
Sweden  -0.214  9.50  0.0021 
Switzerland  -0.440  6.96  0.0083 
Turkey  -0.058  0.17  0.6793 
Ukraine  -1.196  98.56  0.0000 




Table A3  
Returns to educational mismatch, ols 
  Required education  Overeducation  Undereducation 
Country  coeff  %  t  coeff  %  t  coeff  %  t 
Austria  0.077  8.1  7.27  0.031  3.2  2.05  -0.029  -2.8  -1.02 
Belgium  0.078  8.1  5.00  0.019  1.9  1.14  -0.008  -0.8  -0.36 
Czech Republic  0.076  7.9  7.32  0.072  7.5  3.85  -0.007  -0.7  -0.24 
Denmark  0.063  6.5  6.28  0.013  1.4  1.07  -0.032  -3.2  -1.88 
Estonia  0.136  14.5  13.92  0.049  5.0  4.30  -0.030  -2.9  -1.00 
Finland  0.087  9.1  16.73  0.011  1.1  1.24  -0.031  -3.1  -2.85 
France  0.129  13.8  10.67  0.017  1.7  0.68  -0.056  -5.4  -4.93 
Germany  0.116  12.3  11.22  0.049  5.0  2.04  -0.039  -3.8  -3.09 
Great Britain  0.147  15.8  3.96  0.054  5.5  1.93  -0.058  -5.6  -1.89 
Greece  0.057  5.9  3.93  0.026  2.6  2.21  -0.011  -1.0  -0.30 
Hungary  0.129  13.7  8.22  0.053  5.5  1.79  -0.071  -6.8  -3.21 
Iceland  0.076  7.9  8.47  0.029  2.9  1.64  -0.003  -0.3  -0.25 
Ireland  0.100  10.5  3.82  0.065  6.7  3.37  -0.023  -2.3  -0.74 
Luxembourg  0.095  10.0  9.15  0.086  9.0  5.36  -0.004  -0.4  -0.34 
Netherlands  0.124  13.2  11.84  0.009  0.9  0.35  -0.037  -3.6  -3.48 
Norway  0.077  8.0  12.84  0.040  4.1  3.72  -0.021  -2.1  -1.98 
Poland  0.099  10.5  9.81  0.068  7.0  5.31  -0.017  -1.7  -0.83 
Portugal  0.133  14.2  14.85  0.048  5.0  2.94  -0.008  -0.8  -0.41 
Slovakia  0.088  9.2  11.09  0.051  5.2  2.39  -0.010  -1.0  -0.65 
Slovenia  0.095  10.0  4.53  -0.019  -1.9  -0.34  -0.097  -9.3  -2.65 
Spain  0.084  8.7  7.88  0.040  4.1  3.86  -0.036  -3.5  -2.74 
Sweden  0.076  7.9  18.16  0.023  2.4  2.50  -0.028  -2.8  -3.27 
Switzerland  0.086  8.9  10.63  0.029  2.9  1.71  -0.029  -2.8  -2.82 
Turkey  0.109  11.6  6.59  0.047  4.8  1.62  -0.062  -6.0  -3.38 
Ukraine  0.069  7.1  2.98  -0.015  -1.5  -0.33  -0.110  -10.4  -3.25 
Pooled  0.108  11.4  20.45  0.044  4.5  7.57  -0.041  -4.1  -7.05 
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Table A4  
Parameters of returns to attained education from earnings functions estimated 
by Heckman selection-correction estimator, and tests of independence of 
equations             
Country  Coefficient  Per cent  z  Lambda  Wald test of independent equations 
Austria  0.060  6.2  6.2  -0.494  29.57 
Belgium  0.034  3.5  3.7  0.854  122.19 
Czech Republic  0.069  7.1  8.2  -0.322  10.35 
Denmark  0.045  4.6  5.4  0.076  1.99 
Estonia  0.085  8.8  10.2  -0.292  8.69 
Finland  0.053  5.4  10.7  -0.024  0.05 
France  0.073  7.6  7.3  0.743  129.15 
Germany  0.073  7.6  9.9  -0.714  69.82 
Great Britain  0.093  9.7  8.3  -1.189  62.14 
Greece  0.033  3.4  3.9  0.684  26.25 
Hungary  0.118  12.5  7.7  -0.086  0.39 
Iceland  0.039  4.0  4.4  -0.156  1.83 
Ireland  0.065  6.7  6.2  -1.273  53.86 
Luxembourg  0.056  5.7  7.8  -0.618  24.73 
Netherlands  0.071  7.3  8.5  -0.116  1.15 
Norway  0.051  5.3  10.6  -0.374  6.91 
Poland  0.079  8.2  9.3  -0.100  1.28 
Portugal  0.077  8.0  8.0  -0.033  0.07 
Slovakia  0.062  6.4  6.2  -0.381  8.00 
Slovenia  0.083  8.7  6.6  -1.268  255.83 
Spain  0.050  5.1  9.3  -0.059  0.92 
Sweden  0.056  5.8  13.9  -0.194  3.27 
Switzerland  0.053  5.5  8.9  -0.497  8.29 
Turkey  0.083  8.6  6.6  0.000  0.00 
Ukraine  0.082  8.6  4.7  -1.183  105.94 
Pooled  0.070  7.2  21.4  -0.523  16.63 
The equations estimated 
earnings equation 
dependent variable: log usual monthly before-tax earnings 
control variables: sex, potential labour market experience and its square; country dummies in the case of pooled 
sample (reference: Austria) 
participation equation 
dependent variable: worker 
control variables: sex, age, age squared, number of choldren in the family, sex of children; country dummies in 




Parameters of returns to attained education from earnings functions estimated 
by ols 
Country  Coefficient  Per cent  t  R2 
Austria  0.059  6.1  6.2  0.330 
Belgium  0.029  2.9  2.2  0.103 
Czech 
Republic  0.068  7.1  7.7  0.275 
Denmark  0.044  4.5  5.4  0.063 
Estonia  0.085  8.9  10.1  0.254 
Finland  0.053  5.4  10.8  0.334 
France  0.083  8.7  8.4  0.243 
Germany  0.074  7.7  9.4  0.324 
Great Britain  0.095  9.9  6.0  0.167 
Greece  0.031  3.2  3.2  0.191 
Hungary  0.117  12.5  7.4  0.334 
Iceland  0.039  3.9  4.4  0.317 
Ireland  0.059  6.1  3.5  0.044 
Luxembourg  0.059  6.0  7.8  0.224 
Netherlands  0.070  7.2  8.5  0.320 
Norway  0.052  5.3  10.4  0.247 
Poland  0.080  8.3  9.4  0.218 
Portugal  0.077  8.0  9.1  0.394 
Slovakia  0.060  6.2  5.5  0.240 
Slovenia  0.079  8.2  4.2  0.063 
Spain  0.050  5.2  9.2  0.237 
Sweden  0.055  5.7  15.1  0.347 
Switzerland  0.055  5.7  9.3  0.358 
Turkey  0.083  8.7  7.1  0.279 
Ukraine  0.069  7.1  3.5  0.035 
Pooled  0.070  7.3  22.3  0.757 
The equation estimated 
dependent variable: log usual monthly before-tax earnings 
control variables: sex, potential labour market experience and its square; country dummies in the case of pooled 
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